Part C: THE
BALANCE OF FORCES IN 2012
71. We noted in Strategy and Tactics 2007 that the building of
a National Democratic Society is a conscious construct (as was the case for the
struggle against apartheid colonialism), dependent on conscious action and
taking place in global and national conditions that are not of our choosing. As
such we have to master the science and art of assessing the objective
conditions and subjective factors that, together, provide opportunities and threats
that render particular preferred actions possible.
72. More specifically, we must understand the terrain on which
we need to undertake our
Second
Transition, in terms of:
• What are
the domestic balance of forces today?
• Who
are the motive forces that must drive this phase? What are their
strengths and
weaknesses?
• What other
forces in society should we mobilise, and how do we build
national
consensus around our national vision?
• What
are the forces and tendencies opposed to our programme of socioeconomic
transformation,
and how do we neutralise or isolate these?
• What
is the global context in which we operate and what opportunities and
threats does
this context present?
73. Finally, are the subjective and objective conditions
conducive for a qualitative leap
forward in
terms of a National Democratic Society? What are the applicable lessons from
our political
transition?
Drivers of
change: the motive forces
74. Strategy and Tactics 2007 articulates the two imperatives
that inform our approach to
the forces
for change in the following manner. The first is the responsibility of the ANC
to mobilise
all South Africans towards the ongoing transformation of the country. The
second is
recognition that there are national and social forces within the country that
objectively
stand to gain from transformation, and therefore should constitute the
motive or
driving forces for change. At any point in time the ANC has to unite the
nation,
as well as
lead the motive forces. This is the major reason for our conscious decision to
remain a
liberation movement and not simply become a political party.
75. Before
1994, our historical definitions of ‘the motive forces’ and ‘the enemy’ were as
follows:
“…the liberation movement characterised Africans in
particular and Blacks in general as
the motive forces of the NDR. These communities were,
by law, defined outside of the
political system except as servants of white minority
domination. In class terms, they
were made up of workers and the rural poor, the middle
strata including small business
operators, and real or aspirant capitalists (S&T,
par. 95)
“The liberation movement defined the enemy, on the
other hand, as the system of white
minority domination with the white community being the
beneficiaries and defenders of
this system. These in turn were made up of workers,
middle strata and capitalists.
Monopoly capital was identified as the chief enemy of
the NDR. It was also emphasised
that apartheid was not in the long-term interest of
the white community.” (par. 96)
76. Eighteen years into democracy, does this still apply? Strategy
and Tactics 2007 notes
that although
the character of the NDR remains the same, the central task has shifted
towards the
eradication of the socio-economic legacy of apartheid colonialism, and will
remain so for
many years. This socio-economic legacy is linked to the basic
contradictions
that the National Democratic Revolution seeks to resolve. These
contradictions
include the national question, the issue of super exploitation, and
patriarchal
relations.
The national question and socio-economic transformation
77. The contradictions that the NDR seeks to resolve are
expressed firstly in national terms,
the
liberation of Africans in particular and blacks in general. After 18 years of
democracy,
and in the context of social and economic transformation, the resolution of
the national
question remains critical.
78. The deracialisation of our polity, the extension of basic
services and affirmative action
have helped
to build the confidence of our people that a non-racial and non-sexist state
is indeed for
them. However, the majority of our people live in townships and rural areas
that are
economically depressed, and social stratification and inequality within the
black
community is
increasing. The vast majority of poor households remain black, rural and
female.
79. According to the NPC, the black middle class has grown by
30% in 2005, adding another
421 000 black
middle class individuals to SA’s middle-income layer, and bringing the
black section
of the population’s share of the middle class to just under one third.
80. Black economic empowerment, enterprise development and
efforts to build social
consensus
around deracialising and broadening ownership and control of the economy
have had some
effects. The Mining Charter, for example, set modest targets of black
ownership of
15% by 2009 and 26% by 2014, a 40% representation of historically
disadvantaged
South African in management ranks, and a commitment from the mining
industry to
improve mineworkers’ housing, literacy and skills. Eight years after the
adoption of
the Charter, black ownership of the JSE’s top 25 mining companies was
recorded at
about 5% at the end of March 2010 (5).
81. Another indicator of the national question and
socio-economic progress is income
distribution
by race. Income of any group includes wages, income from assets (i.e.
income from
other factors of production, capital, land and entrepreneurship) as well as
income from
social grants. Table 1 below shows that on average per capita incomes
have
increased for all groups since 1993.
82. In terms of racial distribution of per capita income,
African and coloured income levels in
2008 were
still only 13% and 22% respectively of white per capita income, compared to
10.9% and
19.3% in 1993. The income gap for Indians has narrowed, with Indian per
capita income
in 2008 standing at 60% of those of whites as against 42% in 1993 (6).
Per capita
income of whites, according to the NPC Diagnostic Report, grew by 6% per
year since
1995, whereas per capita income of Africans only grew by 2% during the
same period.
Table 1. Per capita personal income by race group
Year White Indian Coloured African Average
Per capita income in constant 2000 Rands:
1993 46 486 19 537 8 990 5 073 11 177
1995 48 387 23 424 9 668 6 525 12 572
2000 56 179 23 025 12 911 8 926 16 220
2008 75 297 51 457 16 567 9 790 17 475
Relative per capita personal incomes (% of White
level):
1993 100 42.0 19.3 10.9 24.0
1995 100 48.4 20.0 13.5 26.0
2000 100 41.0 23.0 15.9 28.9
2008 100 60.0 22.0 13.0 23.2
Source: from Liebbrandt et al (2010:13)
83. Among the main reasons for slow growth in per capita income
among blacks in general
are the
persistently high rates of unemployment and growing under-employment, and
the fact that
black income from assets also lags behind.
84. The NPC (2010:9) further drew attention to the fact that
between 2001 and 2010, per
capita income
grew by 2% annually, with per capita income falling by 4% during the
recession,
and thus:
“Other developing countries such as Mexico, Korea and
Malaysia overtook South Africa’s
level of income per capita in the 1980s. If we wanted
to achieve a similar per capita
income to Poland or Portugal today, it would take 35
years at current growth rates, but if
per capita incomes grew by 4 percent annually it would
take just 17 years. At our current
GDP per capita growth, we would need 90 years to
achieve a level similar to the United
States.”
The working class
85. The Strategy and Tactics defines black workers as both employed and unemployed,
and urban and
rural. Their tasks in this phase of the NDR are to:
• advance
the struggle for quality jobs and job security;
• build
class and national solidarity among all sectors of workers – casualised,
informal
and
unemployed;
• ensure
strategic contribution to the building of the developmental state, including
socio-economic
development, provision of services and facilitating people’s
participation;
• direct
and expand workers’ institutional capital towards national development;
• engage
capital (and the state) in ensuring a national developmental vision that
contributes
towards thoroughgoing socio-economic transformation;
• build
solidarity with white workers to contribute towards national development and
social
justice;
• fight
patriarchal relations of production and reproduction that continue to oppress
Women
86. The black working class is also expected to lead in
defining a common national vision
and
implementing a common programme of action among all the motive forces and the
nation as a
whole – thus exercising working class leadership.
Discussion questions
• What have been the major changes impacting on the
working class since our
transition to democracy?
• The trade union movement and our ally Cosatu are the
most important organised
formations of workers. What role does the trade union
movement play in the
process of transformation, and what are its strengths
and weaknesses?
• What about the unemployed, those in rural areas and
women workers?
• What is the role of the SACP in relation to the tasks
of the working class?
• How should working class leadership find expression in
the ANC today?
• How should the national democratic state relate to the
working class?
The rural poor
87. Strategy and Tactics 2007 highlighted the importance of the rural poor as part of the
working class
– mostly unemployed, landless, involved in survivalist farming, or farm
workers. They
therefore face the tasks of:
• contributing
to defining and implementing agrarian reform, land reform, food
security and
rural development;
• enhancing
struggles for rural workers’ rights, especially farm workers;
• changing
patriarchal relations of production and reproduction that continue to render
women
second-class citizens;
• engaging
white compatriots to further agrarian and land reform and rural
development.
Discussion questions
• Are our ward based ANC branches rising to the occasion
of organising this sector of our
people? What other organisations and social forces do
we find among this section of the
motive forces that we must engage with?
• As we prepare for a centenary since the 1913 Land Act,
what is the state of land reform in
your region and municipality?
• Our integrated rural development programme emphasises
the building of emerging and
small-holding farmers. What are the tasks of the
Alliance in this regard?
• What are the concrete tasks to build a non-sexist
society in rural areas?
• How has the situation of farm workers changed over the
last 18 years and what other
practical steps are necessary to improve their
situation?
• What other forces must we engage to take forward the
programmes of agrarian and rural
development?
The middle strata
88. As part of the motive forces, the middle strata constitute a critical resource of the
NDR. They
include the intelligentsia, small business operators and professionals. Their
tasks are to:
• use
their skills and sectoral location to advance socio-economic transformation;
• foster
progressive intellectual discourse on the values, culture and challenges of our
new society;
• contribute
towards equality, human rights and social justice.
89. The middle strata broadly, but the intelligentsia in
particular, play an important role in
shaping ideas
and perceptions in society. Their ongoing engagement, and their
deliberate
recruitment into the movement, should be part of not only influencing this
strata, but
also ensuring a constant flow of fresh and challenging ideas within the ANC
and society.
90. A section within this stratum that we should also pay
particular attention to are students
and young
professionals, entrepreneurs and cultural activists. Many of them, having
been the
first generation experiencing integration in education (at schools and
universities),
have less of the hang-ups of the older generations, are more confident
with a
definite global sense and are technology savvy. They are the direct
beneficiaries
of freedom
and our affirmative action policies. The ANC Youth League and the
progressive
student movement needs to improve its mobilisation of this sector.
91. This sector also includes students at universities and futher
education and training (FET)
colleges, the
future professionals, public servants and artisans. The state of the student
movement is
therefore particularly important. Consideration also needs to be given to
the proposals
from the ANC Youth League of a more deliberate policy of developing this
young cadre,
including sending many, many more of them out of the country for further
studies and
experience, something which our bilateral relations with many countries
should
facilitate.
Discussion questions
• Is growing the middle class part of our national
democratic tasks, and what should be
done over the next few decades to further expand this
strata?
• A large part of the new middle strata is in the public
sector. What role should they play
to advance the cause of social transformation?
• Are the core values represented and articulated by
different sectors within this strata the
values of the National Democratic Society we seek to
build, and why is this the case?
• What are the challenges faced by this strata, and is
the ANC organised to engage and
organise them effectively?
The core of a patriotic bourgeoisie?
92. We have, though in a limited form, expanded the number of
emerging black
capitalists as a product of democratic change
and a direct creation of the task of
deracialising
the economy. Given this objective interest they have been regarded as part
of the motive
forces. They must therefore contribute towards changing the structure of
the economy,
adding value to:
• industrialisation
and the development of national productive capacity;
• research,
innovation, productivity, technology and skills development;
• job
creation, labour intensive sectors and local economic development;
• equality
and social justice;
• regional
and continental economic integration; and,
• South-South
economic cooperation.
93. However, the dependence of this stratum on white and
multinational capital and the
state, makes
some susceptible to pursue narrow interests, which may not always be in
the interest
of economic transformation. The last few years have seen fierce debates
about our
broad-based black economic empowerment strategy (BBBEE). Relevant to this
discussion is
the fact that many in this stratum may be wealthy, but it is wealth based
not on
involvement in production and the expansion of productive capacity, but on
holding
shares in existing companies.
94. The development of this stratum is therefore closely linked
to locating our BBBEE policies in the context of economic transformation and
growth through building companies in the priority and labour intensive sectors
identified in industrial policies, and contributing to
localisation,
technology and skills development, and fixed capital formation.
Discussion points
• Is this strata organised in a manner that will help
take forward these tasks, and
are we engaging them to play this role?
• What role should this strata play with respect to
white capital and the tasks of
developing the productive forces, industrialisation
and job creation?
What about
the various strata and classes in the white community?
95. Democratisation and the success of a National Democratic
Society are in both the short
and long-term
interest of white South Africans. This is however not always reflected in
their
national consciousness or voting patterns, with many still feeling threatened
by
transformation,
actively campaigning against it, underpinned by skepticism about the
capabilities
of a black government. Some of our own actions and a sensationalist media
also play
into these perceptions. These contradictions take place in a democratic order.
We are
therefore no longer locked in mortal combat, but engaging in legitimate
discourse and
electoral politics.
96. The ANC
must therefore continue to engage with various strata and interests within the
white
community on our national vision.
Our approach to private capital
97. Strategy and Tactics describes the relationship with
private (mainly white) capital as
unity and
struggle of opposites – of cooperation and contestation – in the quest to
transform the
structure of, and grow, the economy.
98. Globally – whether it is in the Asian developmental states,
the social democratic states,
or even
socialism with Chinese characteristics – in order to achieve a national
developmental
vision, the participation of private capital is inevitable. Such participation
is sought
voluntarily through engagement and social pacts, combined with regulation,
through
allocative capital and through the state leading and directing
industrialisation
and the
development of priority economic sectors, including ownership in one form or
another in
such sectors.
99. It includes challenging and engaging monopoly capital to
the extent that they are an
obstacle to
our national vision (by, for example, blocking new entrants into various
sectors of
the economy) as well as with regards our quest to build social justice and
reduce
inequality.
100. During our political transition, the National Party as the
political representatives of the
white ruling
bloc was a critical part of the political transition. During a socio-economic
transition,
white capital will have to be a critical part of consensus on a socio-economic
transition.
And, as with the political negotiations, they will have their own agenda and
tactics, and
we will have to engage and struggle to ensure that our vision forms the
basis of
national consensus.
101. This requires an ANC that continues to deepen its
understanding of the political economy of the country and the changing nature
of capital in South Africa, including the
financialisation
of companies, the role of trans-national corporations, and the dynamics
of different
economic sectors and markets (local, national, regional and global) so as to
implement
appropriate approaches.
Obstacles to
transformation
102. Opposition to political consolidation and socio-economic
transformation may not only
come from
various national or social strata and classes. It may also be the result of
material (our
productive capacity and state of industrialisation, global productive forces,
availability
of agricultural land) and subjective conditions (e.g. a low-skilled workforce,
poor
performing education and health systems, or a culture of greed and corruption).
103. We must therefore identify and engage with these factors
as they relate to the central
task of the
NDR in the current phase – i.e. our second transition of socio-economic
transformation.
This is an important part of our analysis of the balance of forces, so as
to develop
strategies that are realistic and aimed at achieving our objectives, even when
we have to
take mitigating steps.
104. The NPC Diagnostic report (2010) explored many of these
obstacles. Firstly, it identified a list of indicators of ‘societies in
decline’, noting that these are to various degrees
relevant to
South Africa today:
• Rising
corruption.
• Weakening
of state and civil society institutions.
• Poor
economic management.
• Skills
and capital flight.
• Politics
dominated by short-termism, ethnicity or factionalism.
• Lack
of maintenance of infrastructure and standards of service.
105. More specifically, it identified the following key
obstacles to movement forward in South Africa today:
• Widespread
poverty and extreme and persistent inequality.
• Poor
and substandard quality of education for the majority.
• Poorly
located and inadequate infrastructure, which limits social inclusion and
faster
economic growth.
• A
highly resource-intensive and unsustainable growth path.
• Spatial
challenges that continue to marginalise the poor.
• An
ailing public health system that confronts a massive disease burden.
• Uneven
performance of the public service.
• Corruption,
which undermines state legitimacy and service delivery.
• South
Africa remains a divided society
Discussion points
• Are we beginning to experience elements of ‘a society
in decline’ as defined by the NPC
and why?
Other macro
trends
106. There are other macro trends that may not necessarily be
obstacles, depending on policy responses.
107. Our youth bulge: The
first is the demographic changes in South Africa. We, like many
developing
countries, have a youth bulge, meaning that we have a large proportion of
young people
relative to the overall population. Unlike other developing countries where
the bulge
usually lasts one generation, ours may stretch over more than one due to the
impact of the
AIDS epidemic.
108. Developing countries have and can reap a ‘demographic
dividend’, because the
proportion of
the population active in the labour market is large relative to those who
are not. A
demographic dividend occurs when household dependency ratios are low,
income per
head rises, allowing for greater investment per capita in social development,
the economy
and in the household. The demographic dividend is only realised through
policies that
ensure appropriate levels of education, health and economic participation. If
not, the
opposite result may ensue – a large population of teenagers and young adults
who are
unemployed and alienated.
109. The situation of young people in South Africa, and
particularly of youth unemployment,
has been
described as explosive. Every year, around a million young people leave or
drop out of
school, and more than half of them are unable to find jobs or further
education and
training opportunities, and join the ranks of the unemployed or
discouraged.
And yet, this represents us with a great opportunity, to tap the energy and
creativity of
the new generations.
110. Migration and spatial
development issues: Another macro trend described in the NPC
Diagnostic
Report is that of migration. The challenge of rapid urbanisation is something
planners and
local and provincial governments deal with on a daily basis. Our focus has
been on the
challenge this poses to urban and peri-urban areas, but the NPC also noted
other
migration trends in rural areas, including considerable mobility, the expansion
and
densification
of rural informal settlements, and an emerging trend of rural populations
concentrated
along transport corridors.
111. The challenge this poses for both urban and rural
development, and the type of policy
trade offs
that may be required are also listed in the NPC report. The ANC Youth League,
for example,
in its ‘clarion call’ raises the need for us, in addition to our strategies for
the
current
metros and rural areas, to also identify at least nine or ten other secondary
cities
that we want
to develop and grow over the next two decades in a deliberate and
planned
fashion.
112. Apart from inward migration, there is also migration from
other countries, including but
not
exclusively from the African continent. Our migration policy has to situate
this in the
global,
regional and national context, so that we develop sustainable and cooperative
approaches
with other affected countries.
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